

DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF ISLAMIC PARTIES Political Ideology and Electoral Contestation in Indonesia during the Lead-up to the 2024 Election

Zuli Qodir | Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta – Indonesia

Robert W Hefner | Boston University – United States of America

Corresponding author: zuliqodir@umy.ac.id

Abstract: This article discusses the electoral contestation and eventual defeat of Islamic parties in Indonesia's past 2024 general election. Data for this article were collected using a mixed-methods approach. Field research was conducted by the authors between March and June 2022. In addition, the authors also collected data from articles written in various national and international journals, as well as official government offices. Collected data were subsequently analyzed using the perspectives of political sociology and gender justice. Islamic parties and nationalist parties sought to gain the votes of Indonesia's Muslim-majority population by raising such issues as women, education, poverty, and the revival and survival of Islam both at home and abroad. This article also argues that the future of Indonesian Islam lies in two civil society organizations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, which represent the moderate Islam. Political Islam, conversely, relies on an essentialist understanding of Islam to attract voter support. Islamic parties do not share a clear political ideology, nor do religious-nationalist parties.

Keywords: Islamic parties, contestation, ideology, women, discrimination, moderate Islam.

Introduction

The 2024 Indonesian election has proved to involve a brutal yet exciting battle between two political forces. On one side there were political parties that use Islam as a party platform such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the United Development Party (PPP), the Ummah Party, the Gelora Party, and the Pelita Party—or a political ideology—the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the National

Awakening Party (PKB). On the other side there were parties explicitly founded upon the principles of Pancasila: The Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle (PDIP), Golkar Party, Nasdem Party, Gerindra Party, Hanura Party, Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI), and Perindo. It can be said, thus, that the election was an extension of the ongoing conflict between political religion and religious nationalists.¹

These political giants sought to sway the Muslims of Indonesia, who make up the majority of the country's population. In 2020, Indonesia had a population of 274 million; 88.4% of them were Muslim. According to the General Elections Commission, 192,866,254 Indonesians were registered to vote in the 2019 General Election. For the 2024 General Election, it is estimated that this number will reach 195 to 200 million; 132 million of them are Muslim.² As such, Muslim voters have been contested by all parties, both Islamist and nationalist. Many Muslim voters follow either Muhammadiyah or Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the country's two largest Islamic organizations and standard-bearers of Indonesian Islam. However, since the 1990s, many Indonesian Muslims have followed neither organization.³ In the literature, Muhammadiyah is commonly associated with modernist movement, while NU is seen as representing the traditionalist movement. However, given these organizations' Islamic thought and political attitudes, this categorization has received criticisms from several Indonesian and foreign intellectuals alike, including Azyumardi Azra, Syafiq Hasyim, Noorhaidi Hasan, Bambang Pranowo, Ahmad Najib Burhani, Greg Fealy, and Robert W. Hefner.⁴

In the context of Indonesian politics, Muhammadiyah and NU are frequently argued to act as institutionalized forces of civil Islam that maintain a moderate, inclusive, and tolerant Islamic tradition. These two forces counterbalance the thought and behavior of Indonesian

¹ Diego Fossati, "The Resurgence of Ideology in Indonesia: Political Islam, Aliran and Political Behaviour," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 38, 2 (2019): pp. 119–148.

² Saiful Mujani, "Sikap Publik Nasional Terhadap Amandemen Presidensialisme dan DPD," (2021) available at <https://saifulmujani.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/ri-lis-amandemen-presidensialisme-di.pdf>.

³ Yon Machmudi, "The Emergence of New Santri in Indonesia," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 2, 1 (2008): pp. 69–102.

⁴ Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Geertz's Trichotomy of Abangan, Santri, and Priyayi Controversy and Continuity," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 11, 2 (2017): pp. 329–350.

political Islam, which leans toward conservatism and exclusivism⁵ and is expected to pragmatically use power politics, economic activities, and religious identity in the 2024 election, thereby creating a polarized situation wherein different political choices can harm social relations. Other groups, such as *habaib* (descendants of the prophet Muhammad) also play a role in shaping Muslims' political views nowadays.⁶ Likewise, the issue of caliphate also still lingers among Indonesian this time around.⁷

This political context has created a highly gendered electoral situation. As evidenced by Indonesia's general elections in 2009, 2014, and 2019, Islamic parties have generally positioned women as unequal to men. Women candidates are only fielded by parties to ensure that they are not disqualified by the General Elections Commission (KPU), which requires parties to ensure that at least 30% of their legislative candidates are women.⁸ Often, women are viewed merely as vote-getters, and thus parties select famous women such as singers and film and television artists to attract wider audience. Women's experiences with Indonesian elections are important, given that they are still being discriminated against politically by parties that identify as Islamic.

This article aims to analyze the contestation between Islamist parties and nationalist ones in the 2024 General Election, as well as political campaigns carried out by Islamist and nationalist parties in seeking the votes of Indonesia's Muslim majority. This article further aims to discuss in depth what causes Islamic parties to continue to exist even though they do not get fewer votes than nationalist parties. There are several arguments that can explain this. Muslims in Indonesia constitute the majority of the population, reaching 88.7 percent of the total population of Indonesia. Islamic activists need to actualise their political aspirations, and Islamic parties are assumed to

⁵ Haedar Nashir et al., "Muhammadiyah 'S Moderation Stance In The 2019 General Election Critical Views From Within" *Al Jami'ah* 57, 1 (2019): pp. 1–24.

⁶ Arsyad Sobby Kesuma, Abdul Halim, Nur Syam, "The Religious Politics of Habaib in Surabaya and Bangil East Java: A Socio-Religio-Political Approach," *QIJIS, Qudus International Journal of Islamic Studies* 10, 2 (2022).

⁷ Farid Wajdi Ibrahim, Dicky Wirianto, Shohibul Adib, "The Thought of Figures of Islamic Mass Organization about Caliphate: A Case Study in Banda Aceh and West Java," *Jurnal Ilmiah Islam Futura (JIIF)* 22, 2 (2022)

⁸ Elizabeth Kristi Poerwandari, Ratna Batara Munti, and Jackie Viemilawati, "Pro-Women's Policy Advocacy Movements in Indonesia: Struggles and Reflections," *Asian Journal of Women's Studies* 24, 4 (2018): pp. 489–509.

be a place to fight for Islamic aspirations in Indonesia. They also eagerly adapt to the political context as shown by ideological evolution throughout Indonesian political history, that is from political idealism to pragmatism.⁹ The number of Islamic parties that take turns indicates that the desire of Muslim activists has never died in fighting for the political aspirations of Muslims. Data for this article were collected using a mixed-methods approach. Field research was conducted by the authors between March and June 2022, and involved interviews with activists of Islamist and nationalist parties as well as Muhammadiyah and NU to gain insights into parties' contestations following the general election. In addition, the authors also collected data from articles written in various national and international journals, as well as official government publications from such offices as Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) and Indonesian Statistics Unit (BPS). Collected data were subsequently analyzed using the perspectives of political sociology and gender justice.

Islamic Parties in Indonesia: An Overview

Islamic parties have contested in Indonesian elections ever since the country's 1955 first—and most democratic—elections. During an election that clearly depicted the three pillars of contemporary Indonesian society (nationalism, Islam, and communism), diverse parties sought to gain and maintain power.¹⁰ Combined altogether, the country's Islamic parties received 43.6% of the 37,785,299 votes cast, more than the nationalist parties (30.34%) and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI, 16.4%). The largest of these parties, Masyumi (20.9%), received more votes than PKI and the Indonesian Socialist Party (2.0%). It lost only to the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), which received 22.3% of the vote. The next largest Islamic party, the Nahdlatul Ulama Party, received 18.4% of the votes. Therefore, had votes cast for Masyumi and the NU Party been combined (39.3%), they would have defeated PNI.¹¹

From this overview, it is evident that Islamic parties received extraordinary support from Indonesian Muslims in the 1955 elections.

⁹ Ali Munhanif, A. Bakir Ihsan, "Ideas, Politics, and The Making of Muslim Democracy: An Historical Trajectory in Indonesia," *Studia Islamika* 30, 3 (2023).

¹⁰ Dirk Tomsa, *Party Politics and Democratization in Indonesia, Party Politics and Democratization in Indonesia* (USA and Canada: Routledge Taylor & Francis, 2008).

¹¹ Republik Indonesia et al., "Pemilu 1955." (1955).

Their strength lay in their ideological struggle, as they sought to fight for the interests of Muslims and even formalize Islamic values in the Indonesian constitution. This struggle was undertaken in a very democratic manner acknowledging the power of other parties without imposing their will upon others.¹² Early Islamic parties, thus, were seen as truly ideological parties, rather than parties of economic or power pragmatism as such.¹³

In addition, the strength of Islamic parties in Indonesia's 1955 General Election was also due to party leaders and activists providing role models for administrators, subordinates, followers, and sympathizers. Ordinary people supported these parties because they saw party leaders as trustworthy, rather than hypocrites in word and deed. These political leaders were also very modest, neither living glamorous lives of luxury nor desiring to be served by their supporters. As stated by Busyro Muqoddas:

“Islamic parties and leaders in 1955 were *ummah* with exemplary souls. They were sincere, firm, and had integrity. Their attitudes were clear on the struggle of Muslims and the nation. [They] Do not live in luxury and thirst for praise from the people. Live simply; even suffer. They never feared of suffering in their struggle and political ideology.”¹⁴

Many of these Islamic parties were concerned by Sukarno's political power as President and as the leader of the PNI. Under his thumb, the leaders of Masyumi and other political parties that differed from the President faced significant political pressure; several, such as Mohammad Natsir and Kasman Singodimedjo, were imprisoned for “endangering Sukarno's government.”¹⁵ Ultimately, Indonesia's largest Islamic parties, consisting of Masyumi, the NU Party, and Sarekat Islam, were dissolved by Sukarno.

¹² Abdul Chalik, Achmad Room Fitrianto, and Ma'shum Ma'shum, “Between Values and Power; Ideological Orientation of Santri-Based Parties in Indonesia,” *Journal of Social and Political Sciences* 2, 4 (2019).

¹³ Nathan John Franklin, *Reproducing Political Islam in Java: The Role of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah Pesantren in the Political Socialisation of the Umat* (Australia: Charles Darwin University, 2014).

¹⁴ Interview with Busyro Muqoddas, 25 June 2022.

¹⁵ F Munabari, “Reconciling Sharia with ‘Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia’: The Ideology and Framing Strategies of the Indonesian Forum of Islamic Society (FUI),” *International Area Studies Review* 20, 3 (2017): pp. 242–263.

Islamic parties such as Masyumi and Sarekat Islam were seen as unifying forces that were straightforward, honest, and firm, even as they avoided sectarianism. So too was Sarekat Islam, the country's oldest Islamic party. Established in 1911 by Hajji Saman Hudi and HOS Cokroaminoto, who had been Sukarno's teacher in politics and Islam, the party continued its founders' firm commitment to fighting for the welfare of Indonesians, including Muslims. Its leader at the time, Haji Agus Salim, was also highly respected, being recognized as an accomplished politician capable of working diplomatically with his political opponents.¹⁶

At the Masyumi party, which received the most votes after PNI, the central figure was Mohammad Natsir, who had served as Sukarno's prime minister during the era of parliamentary democracy. Also prominent were Prawoto Mangkusasmito and Kasman Singodimedjo, who were highly respected for their firm opposition to their political and colonial enemies. These leaders were seen as having great integrity and firmness, yet ultimately Mohammad Natsir, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, and Kasman Singodimedjo were all arrested and imprisoned by Sukarno during the Guided Democracy.¹⁷

The Sarekat Islam and Masyumi had political attitudes and behaviors oriented toward fighting for justice and public welfare. The leaders of these Islamic parties were willing to live in misery, without the facilities provided to other political parties, the state, and the owners of capital. Party leaders even dared to oppose the ruling regime, and thus they were often imprisoned by those in power. Even imprisonment, however, was of little consequence as these parties remained fixed in their belief that the people should not suffer because of the wasteful and extravagant behaviors of their political leaders.¹⁸

Shortly after President Suharto rose to power in 1966, existing Islamic parties were dissolved, with their members compelled to join the United Development Party (PPP)—a party led by a chairman appointed with the blessing of the New Order regime. Later, in 1984,

¹⁶ R. E. Elson and Chiara Formichi, "Why Did Kartosuwiryo Start Shooting? An Account of Dutch-Republican-Islamic Forces Interaction in West Java, 1945-49," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 42, 3 (2011): pp. 458-486.

¹⁷ Firman Noor, "Islamic Party and Pluralism: The View and Attitude of Masyumi towards Pluralism in Politics (1945-1960)," *Al-Jami'ah* 54, 2 (2016): pp. 273-310.

¹⁸ Yuka Kayane, "Historical Formation of Islamist Ideology in Indonesia: The Role of the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (DDII)," *Critical Asian Studies* (2021): pp. 1-20.

the regime mandated that all socio-political organizations in Indonesia had to embrace the principles of Pancasila as their sole basis.¹⁹ In so doing, it subtly dismantled the country's Islamic party, which became little different than nationalist parties such as Golkar and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). Golkar was considered to represent the government party, with its members being soldiers, police officers, public officials, and their families, as well as members of state-sponsored organizations such as Kosgoro, AMPI (Angkatan Muda Pembaruan Indonesia/Yong Generation of Indonesian Renewal), and KNPI (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia/Indonesian Youth National Committee). PDI, meanwhile, was established through the amalgamation of nationalist parties (such as the Indonesian Nationalist Party, the Marhaenism Party, and Parkindo) and Christian ones.²⁰

Suharto resigned on May 21, 1998, ostensibly in the face of Indonesian-style people power, but ultimately due to the lack of solid support within his government. Many of his assistants were no longer loyal, and even rebelled against the President; the Armed Forces (including, at the time, the police) were divided and did not support the President's desire to maintain power; and the Indonesian economy was collapsing. Thus, Indonesia began to enter the Reformasi (reform) era.²¹ This is the point when large-scale demonstrations were carried out by civilians, including students and Non-Governance Organizations (NGOs), made the final push to remove Suharto from the presidency—a position he had held for 32 years.

After Suharto declared his resignation, he was replaced by B.J. Habibie, who served as Indonesia's interim President until elections were held in 1999. During these elections, Islamic, nationalist, Christian, and socialist parties—previously dissolved by Sukarno and Suharto—again competed. Given their ideological diversity, the 1999 elections are commonly described as Indonesia's most democratic

¹⁹ Masykur Hakim, "Soeharto and the Politicization of Indonesian Islam (1968-1998)," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 10, 2 (2016): pp. 159–180.

²⁰ Syarif Hidayatullah, "The Consolidation of the Islamic Traditionalism: A Case Study of the Nahdlatul Ulama," *Prosiding the 4th International Conference on Indonesian Studies: 'Unity, Diversity, and Future'* 4, 1 (2012): pp. 934–943.

²¹ Rachael Diprose, Dave McRae, and Vedi R. Hadiz, "Two Decades of Reformasi in Indonesia: Its Illiberal Turn," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 49, 5 (2019): pp. 691–712.

since the fall of the New Order regime.²² Ideologies were contested freely, without any prohibitions from the Habibie government. Nevertheless, the political conditions did not (and have not) improve much; corruption is rampant, and nepotism (kinship/friendship politics) has strengthened.²³

Since 1999, Indonesia's general elections have been held by a state-established body known as the General Elections Commission (KPU), which consists of academics, democracy activists, and social organizations, all of which work to ensure the representativeness and integrity of the body. All parties seeking to contest elections must register with KPU, which has the authority to determine whether parties meet the administrative criteria for contesting elections based on, among other things, the existence of offices and supporters throughout Indonesia. In subsequent elections, there have never been fewer than ten political parties registered with KPU and contesting elections. Once registered, parties must meet more criteria to field a presidential and vice-presidential candidate: they must receive at least 20% of the vote.²⁴

Indonesia's elections since 1998 have been contested by numerous Islamic parties, including PKS, PPP, PBB, Reform Star Party, Nahdlatul Ulama Party, Islamic Ummah Party, New Masyumi Party, Sarekat Islam Party, PAN, and PKB. Meanwhile, nationalist parties have included PDIP, Golkar, Gerindra, Democratic Party (PD), Nasdem, Perindo, Hanura, and the Indonesian Unity Party (PKPI). Previously, several Catholic and Christian parties—including Parkindo, the Krisna Party, and the Prosperous Peace Party—had contested elections. Other parties registered with KPU but were unable to exceed the electoral threshold: only parties that get 2.5% of the national vote can continue to contest elections.²⁵

²² Thomas B. Pepinsky, R. William Liddle, and Saiful Mujani, "Testing Islam's Political Advantage: Evidence from Indonesia," *American Journal of Political Science* 56, 3 (2012): pp. 584–600.

²³ Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, "Indonesian Politics in 2014: Democracy's Close Call," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 50, 3 (2014): pp. 347–369.

²⁴ "Regulation of the General Election Commission of the Republic of Indonesia Number 10 of 2019 concerning the Fourth Amendment to General Election Commission Regulation Number 7 of 2017" (Jakarta: KPU, 2019).

²⁵ "Results of Recapitulation of Vote Acquisition for the 2019 Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidates" (Jakarta: KPU, 2019).

Overviewing this history, the rivalry between Indonesia's Islamic and nationalist parties has been ongoing since 1955. However, as of writing, not a single Islamic party has received the support of the majority of Indonesia's Muslim-majority population. Meanwhile, nationalist parties such as PDIP, Golkar, Gerindra, Nasdem, Hanura, and the Democratic Party have received strong support from Indonesian Muslims. Islamic parties have always lost the battle for Muslim voters.²⁶

Islamic Parties and Religious-Nationalist Parties

It is increasingly evident that Indonesia's Islamic parties have continued historical trends and faced defeat at the hands of nationalist forces in the past country's 2024 General Election. Several factors influence this phenomenon. Currently, it is not clear what political ideology these parties are fighting for because they are market-oriented (i.e., following the will of the market); they do not strongly defend the people's interests for justice and welfare; they share white-collar crimes such as corruption and discrimination; they put more emphasis on symbolic Islam (especially during religious identity campaigns); they tend to be sectarian and exclusive, and they seek the same votes as other Islamic and nationalist parties.

Several of the activities carried out by Islamic and nationalist parties will be presented here and discussed as potentially harmful to Islamic parties' electoral efforts. First, neither Islamic nor nationalist parties have a clear ideology; they are simply pro-market, and thus seek to profit from market behaviours that do not benefit the masses.²⁷ Islamic parties lack clarity in defending the starving masses from ignorance and poverty. Their ideology is a fragile symbolism, even as their campaigns invigorate their followers. As stated by a Muhammadiyah activist, Hajriyanto Y. Tohari:

“Islamic parties are often not able to make changes and advocate for progress for citizens. It is elementary to predict where Islamic parties' campaigns will go. That is, they always say, 'We will support the implementation of Islamic law. We will maintain the monotheism of Muslims. We will make Islamic values the

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Edward Aspinall, “A Nation in Fragments: Patronage and Neoliberalism in Contemporary Indonesia,” *Critical Asian Studies* 45, 1 (2013): 27–54.

foundation of the nation and state.' But through what means they intend to advance Muslims, that is not clear."²⁸

This statement was reaffirmed by Rizal Sukma, a Muhammadiyah activist and former Ambassador to the United Kingdom,

"Islamic parties are only able to create lively campaigns on social media and attract the masses with promises that are not ideological at all. As capital during their campaigns, Islamic parties rely on sentences considered closer to Allah, such as the takbir and Allahu Akbar. [They say,] 'We are fighting for Islam'. But from the behaviour of party activists, it is not clear what they are fighting for, because their activism is almost the same as that of nationalist party activists."²⁹

The two statements above indicate that Islamic parties differ from nationalist parties only in their founding principles, i.e., Islam for Islamic parties and Pancasila for nationalist parties. Ultimately, there are no significant differences in their political behaviour. For example, nationalist party activists use money politics in elections for legislative and regional executive offices; so, do activists for Islamic parties.³⁰ Likewise, where many activists with nationalist parties have been involved in corruption, numerous Islamic party activists have engaged in the crime either personally or collectively.³¹

Such behaviors make it difficult to ideologically distinguish the activists of nationalist from Islamic parties. Both are actively involved in various forms of social misconducts that violate religious and social norms and ethics. Indeed, such practices seem to be increasingly widespread due to the lax punishments they have received; where party activists fall afoul of the law, political compromises mean that enforcement actions are limited. Activists from Islamic parties and nationalist ones are often rapidly freed from the legal consequences of their actions. It can be said that Islamic and nationalist parties are both actively cultivating distrust amongst voters. Neither is perceived as engaged in carrying out and defending the ideologies that they

²⁸ Interview with Hajriyanto Y. Tohari, 19 June 2022.

²⁹ Interview with Rizal Sukma, 19 June 2022.

³⁰ Edward Aspinall and Ward Berenschot, *Democracy for Sale: Elections, Clientelism, and the State in Indonesia* (London: Cornell University Press Ithaca and London, 2019).

³¹ Fossati, "The Resurgence of Ideology in Indonesia.

promote, such as by fighting for public welfare and social justice.³² Ultimately, this is because Islamic and nationalist activists fundamentally act the same; they seek to benefit themselves and their groups, and thus are better identified as profitseeking or pro-market parties.

Second, the sexual harassment of women by politicians. Just as some nationalist party activists have abused women by engaging in sexual violence and other acts of violence, so too have activists with Islamic parties.³³ As nationalist parties have dismissed members for perpetrating acts of violence against women, so too have Islamic parties.³⁴ Likewise, members of both factions have been found to have committed adultery with fellow legislators, DPRD Member Caught Cheating with Someone's Wife, Now Fired for Damaging the Party's Image, Kompas.com, 1 December 2021 and so <https://aceh.tribun-news.com/2021/12/01>. Jimmy Demianus Ijie, a member of the House of Representatives from the PDIP faction, was reported to be having an affair by his wife, Yunike Howay. He was then complained to the Board of Honour Court (MKD).³⁵ Such acts are evidence of the sexual violence that women often experience, even though some claim that infidelity is consensual.

There are several cases of Islamic and nationalist party activists committing acts of violence and harassment, both verbal and physical, against women. Verbal violence includes such expressions as “women are a burden to male politicians,”³⁶ “women provide less political support for men,”³⁷ and “women are weak,”³⁸ all of which have been

³² Eve Warburton and Edward Aspinall, “Explaining Indonesia’s Democratic Regression: Structure, Agency and Popular Opinion,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 41, 2 (2019): pp. 255–285.

³³ Dina Afrianty, *Women and Sharia Law in Northern Indonesia*, (London: Routledge, 2015).

³⁴ Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi, “Piety and Sexuality in a Public Sphere: Experiences of Javanese Muslim Women’s Political Leadership,” *Asian Journal of Women’s Studies* 23, 3 (2017): pp. 340–362.

³⁵ Bagus Prihantoro Nugroho, “Deretan Anggota DPR Yang Pernah Dituding Selingkuh,” <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3590324/deretan-anggota-dpr-yang-pernah-dituding-selingkuh>

³⁶ Dina Afrianty, “Agents for Change: Local Women’s Organizations and Domestic Violence in Indonesia,” *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 174, 1 (2018): pp. 24–46.

³⁷ Iwraw Ap, “Cultures , Traditions and Violence Against Women : Human Rights Challenges” (2011).

commonly uttered by Islamic and nationalist politicians.³⁹ Also, there have been statements that insult women, such as “a woman's place is beside a man” (especially for young and beautiful women), as well as the idea that women are fundamentally unsuited for the tense world of practical politics.⁴⁰

In such a context, women are positioned as inferior by both Islamic and nationalist parties. Phrases such as “women are attractive because they are beautiful,” “women are attractive because they are young,” “women attract voters because of their softness,” and “women boost vote acquisition because they are feminine symbols” all serve to harass women.⁴¹ Such a tradition of harassment places women under the male gaze and limits them to the politics of “*Ibuism*,” wherein women are perceived as “mothers” who are more suited to being at home with their husbands than being politicians in the public sphere.

Third, Islamic party activists prioritize symbolic Islam in their campaign activities rather than substantial religious beliefs. Activists for parties that have embraced Islam as their principle, for example, commonly use symbols such as the crescent moon, a single star, the Kaaba, or calligraphic renditions of the phrases *lailaha illah* (There is no god other than God) and *Allahu Akbar* (God is great). Meanwhile, substantial matters such as eradicating poverty, improving society (through education and scholarships), and increasing media intelligence do not receive an adequate treatment from Islamic parties.⁴² Islamic party figures and activists seem prouder to display formal symbols rather than espouse substantive Islamic values during their campaign activities.

³⁸ Bruce Hoffman, Jacob Ware, and Ezra Shapiro, “Assessing the Threat of Incel Violence,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 43, 7 (2020): pp. 565–587.

³⁹ Rebecca Kuperberg, “Intersectional Violence against Women in Politics,” *Politics and Gender* 14, 4 (2018): pp. 685–690.

⁴⁰ Ch Mufidah, “Complexities in Dealing with Gender Inequality: Muslim Women and Mosque-Based Social Services in East Java Indonesia,” *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 11, 2 (2017): pp. 459–488.

⁴¹ Jan H. Pierskalla et al., “Democratization and Representative Bureaucracy: An Analysis of Promotion Patterns in Indonesia’s Civil Service, 1980–2015,” *American Journal of Political Science* (2020): pp. 1–17.

⁴² Suzanne Brenner, “Private Moralities in the Public Sphere: Democratization, Islam, and Gender in Indonesia,” *American Anthropologist* 113, 3 (2011): pp. 478–490.

In addition, the principles, images, and political platforms presented by the elites and activists of Islamic parties tend to be sectarian and exclusive.⁴³ These elites present themselves as politicians who protect themselves and their followers from a nebulous "other", such as practitioners of different religions and sects such as Shi'ism and Ahmadiyya. They appear unwilling to accept interfaith and cross-religious associations, as they think that such associations will damage their relations with their passionate supporters. Therefore, they are only willing to associate with members of their group.

Such an explanation was reinforced by Faozan Amar, an activist with the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP):

"When campaigning, Islamic parties did not put forward a clear program for improving access to education. There are thousands of poor people, but no access to scholarships for students. Islamic parties invite people to improve their faith, piety, and worship by holding majlis *taklim*, getting closer to pious people, and being diligent in praying. This is what places Islamic parties as exclusive, as if they are only for Muslims."⁴⁴

Such an attitude creates the impression that Islamic parties and their leaders are exclusive, thereby preventing the creation of space for dialogue and cooperation between party members and those who differ from them. Parties only create space for communication with their groups, which they regard as supporters who will bring their party to victory. Political campaigns on social media and offline campaigns are decorated.⁴⁵ Ultimately, they forget that everything is part of the public record, creating the impression that Islamic parties are sectarian and exclusive parties that do not give space to those who are considered different.

The various kinds of hate speech made by Islamic party activists are obvious during political campaigns. During the 2019 General Elections, such claims included—for instance—that non-Islamic parties are satanic entities seeking the destruction of Islam in Indonesia. This situation was noted by Zuhairi Mizrawi, a PDIP coalition and Indonesian Ambassador to Tunisia:

⁴³ Lili Romli, "Electoral Power Structure of Islamic Parties in Reform Era Indonesia," *Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review* 5, 2 (2020): pp. 192–213.

⁴⁴ Interview with Faozan Amar, 12 June 2022.

⁴⁵ Vedi R. Hadiz, "Imagine All the People? Mobilising Islamic Populism for Right-Wing Politics in Indonesia," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 48, 4 (2018): pp. 566–583.

“Islamic parties tend to think that nationalist parties are anti-Islamic, that nationalist parties do not fight for Muslims and are even hostile to Islam. [They claim that] Islamic parties are against Islamic symbols such as mosques, congregational prayers, and recitations (*taklim*), so if a nationalist party controls the government, Islam in Indonesia will be eliminated.”⁴⁶

This statement illustrates the unhealthiest of the political competition between Islamic and nationalist parties. Islamic parties tend to use any means necessary to attack nationalist parties, including claims that cannot be justified or evidenced. Nevertheless, such claims are often believed by organizations and activists whose religious ideology tends to be conservative or even radical, who in turn pledge their political support to Islamic Party.

Fourth, Islamic parties are competing with other parties (both fellow Islamic and nationalists) for the same voters. As an example, take parties such as PPP and PKB, both of which target the same segment of society: members of Nahdlatul Ulama. PPP relies on supporters from Islamic boarding schools because the party consists of *kiai* (preachers) and *santri* (students) from these institutions. Likewise, PKB was founded by *kiai* and is driven primarily by *santri*. Thus, these two parties frequently compete for the same voters during legislative and general elections.

Meanwhile, PKS, PAN, Gelora, Pelita, and the Ummat can be said to be fighting for the support of modernist Muslims, i.e., those involved in Muhammadiyah and other non-NU organizations. As most modernist Muslims tend to be associated with Muhammadiyah, the four parties identified above compete for the estimated 40 million members of that organization. Likewise, NU is often said to have some 100 million of Muslims. Therefore, these organizations collectively account for approximately 140 million potential voters.⁴⁷

At the same time, Islamic parties must compete with nationalist parties that have networks at the lowest levels, including PDIP, Golkar Party, Gerindra, Democratic Party, and Nasdem, which likewise seek to garner support from the traditionalist and modernist Muslims that represent more than 70% of the voter base.⁴⁸ In the 2004, 2009, 2014,

⁴⁶ Interview with Zuhairi Mizrawi, 19 June 2022.

⁴⁷ Saiful Mujani, “Religious Democrats: Democratic Culture and Muslim Political Participation in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” *ProQuest Dissertations and Theses*, 2003.

⁴⁸ Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani, “Testing Islam’s Political Advantage.”

and 2019 elections, nationalist parties won the battle. Looking at the 2014 and 2019 elections, Islamic parties were unable to compete with nationalist ones, and thus they are unable to nominate their own presidential and vice-presidential candidates. The past 2024 General Election has proven once again that Islamic parties cannot overpower nationalist parties.

After the elections, what the voters can do is to wait for the realization of political campaigns of party elites and activists, which usually serve as “sales campaigns” to attract the masses while doing little to advance the needs of the people. After the election, elites and activists from both parties will drain the country’s wealth through corruption. Activists from Islamic and nationalist parties have also committed sexual harassment and other acts of violence against women. These collective behaviours will make Islamic parties experience defeat in their face-off against nationalist parties.

Political Ideology: Islamism vs Nationalism

The political ideology championed by Islamic parties can be said to best resemble a ‘symbolic’ Islamic ideology, one built upon the foundation of implementing sharia law. Symbolic Islam is the most tangible fruit of Islamism, a political framing of the religion in the political realm that neglects substantial values.⁴⁹ Islamic parties have not embraced post-Islamism, a political movement that uses Islamic ethical values to advance the public interest. Rather, as noted by Masud, Islamic parties still deal with the most surface-level issues rather than the intellectual challenge of providing an ethical framework for society.⁵⁰ This often positions Islamic parties and their supporters as anti-democracy, even though there are no democratic principles that contradict Islam.

In addition to religious symbols, Islamic parties in Indonesia still too often rely on bombastic expressions and claims that they are defending Muslims from anti-Islamic groups. Phrases such as “The Islamic Party is the defender of Islam”, “The Islamic Party is the champion of Islam”, and “The Islamic Party is the Party of God”, are

⁴⁹ Asef Bayat, “Islamism and Social Movement Theory,” *Third World Quarterly* 26, 6 (2005): pp. 891–908.

⁵⁰ Muhammad Khalid Masud, “Religion and State Are Twin Brothers: Classical Muslim Political Theory,” *Islam and Civilisational Renewal* 9, 1 (2018): pp. 9–26.

examples that occur in Indonesian political campaigns.⁵¹ Islamic parties place themselves as the vanguard of the faithful, without recognizing the contributions of Islamic communities such as Muhammadiyah and NU, which tend to do more to advance the interests of Indonesian Muslims. Muhammadiyah, for example, operates 178 universities throughout Indonesia; NU, meanwhile, has more than 200,000 Islamic boarding schools spread throughout the country.⁵² Political parties merely make political claims to defend marginalized and less-educated Muslims, rather than operating educational facilities or boarding schools that have tangible benefits for everyday life. At the same time, Islamic parties claim close ties to Muhammadiyah and NU, hoping to draw on these two Islamic organizations' followers and educational institutions scattered throughout Indonesia. In other words, Islamic parties generally use Muhammadiyah and NU for their political interests rather than creating partnerships that could tangibly empower marginalized Islamic communities.

Also common among Islamic parties is a campaign against a (claimed) communist movement, which political actors hold will rise again in Indonesia if a nationalist party wins the general election.⁵³ It is claimed that, if a nationalist party installs its president, the national philosophy of Pancasila will be replaced with a communist ideology. According to this narrative, Muslims will be prohibited from worshipping by the government; *Adhan* (calling for prayers) will be banned; mosques will be prohibited from performing congregational prayers, sacrifices will be denied; and the Hajj will be prohibited.⁵⁴ Such claims have already been made and found popular traction in the 2014 and 2019 elections; In the 2024 elections, the issue of the use of religion and the rise of communism did not occur as in the previous elections. Prabowo-Gibran eventually won the battle.

Islamic parties frequently advance a pan-Islamic platform during their political activities, voicing concern for the struggles of Muslims in

⁵¹ Greg Barton and Ihsan Yilmaz, "Contestations of Islamic Religious Ideas in Indonesia" (2021): pp. 1–20.

⁵² Haedar Nashir et al., "Muhammadiyah's Moderation Stance in The 2019 General Election," *Journal of Islamic Studies* (2019).

⁵³ Jeremy Menchik, *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

⁵⁴ Muchamad Ali Safa'at, "Indonesian Secularities On the Influence of the State-Islam Relationship on Legal and Political Developments," *HCAS's Working Paper Series serves* 13 (2019).

countries where they are a minority (for instance, Cambodia, Southern Thailand, Southern Philippines, Australia, and the United Kingdom).⁵⁵ Islamic parties regularly hold demonstrations when negative stories emerge about Muslims in non-Muslim majority nations, thereby creating an image of themselves as the defenders of Muslims around the world, even as they fail to mobilize local voters.⁵⁶ In advancing this political narrative, Islamic parties often disseminate videos and other media replete with false claims that Muslims abroad face high levels of political and humanitarian discrimination. Cases such as Rohingya, Pattani, Palestine and South Pilipina are brought to the attention of Islamic parties in demonstrations.

However, such platforms are ultimately contradicted by Islamic parties' political manoeuvrings. After campaigning as defenders of Muslims who fight for Islam and for Muslims both in Indonesia and in Muslim-minority countries, party activists encourage Islamic parties to form coalitions with the very same nationalist parties that they have accused of being anti-Islam and of failing to defend Muslims. Islamic parties no longer see their parties and nationalist parties as having different political and ideological directions,⁵⁷ but instead consider the means of installing their desired candidate in the executive body. Therefore, Islam is only used as a means of gaining power rather than a true ideology.

Nationalist parties, meanwhile, emphasize the national ideology and philosophy of Pancasila as the sole foundation of the state through slogans such as 'I am Pancasila' and 'Pancasila is not dead'. Nationalist parties position themselves as heirs to the Indonesian spirit, even as they accuse Islamic parties of being less nationalistic and anti-Pancasila, with the hidden agenda of establishing an Islamic state by enacting sharia regulations.⁵⁸ Nationalist parties such as PDIP often

⁵⁵ S E Wieringa, "The Impact of Indonesia's 2019 Presidential Campaign on the Human Rights Movement: Narrow Solidarity versus Affinity," *Open Journal of Political Science* (2020).

⁵⁶ IPAC, *After Ahok: The Islamist Agenda in Indonesia*, 2018.

⁵⁷ Michael Buehler and Dani Muhtada, "Democratization and the Diffusion of Shari 'a Law: Comparative Insights from Indonesia" *Southeast Asia Research* 24, 2 (2016): pp. 261–282.

⁵⁸ Nyarwi Ahmad, "Populist Political Ideation and Communication of Gubernatorial Candidates in Indonesia's 2018 Gubernatorial Elections: Anti-Establishment Views, Secular Nationalism and Islamism as Ideational-Populist Elements," *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* 1 (2020).

frame PPP as having most strongly advocated for sharia regulations in several regencies/cities, including Bogor, Sumenep, Bandung, Padang, Tasikmalaya, and Mataram.⁵⁹ Even though some regencies/cities implemented sharia regulations due to pressure from nationalist parties, such as Golkar and PDIP, the image that it is solely Islamic parties who support the implementation of sharia regulations cannot be removed.

Nationalist parties doubt the nationalism of Islamic parties due to their continued emphasis on Islamic themes. In several campaigns, nationalist parties have clashed with Islamic parties because of religious issues, such as the difficulty experienced by non-Islamic minorities in Indonesia when seeking to build houses of worship or express their beliefs. Such minorities are ultimately dragged into violent digital campaigns on social media where nationalist parties argue that their opponents are less open to minority communities.⁶⁰ This results in prolonged virtual conflict, which is markedly different from the reality on the ground, wherein activists from Islamic and nationalist parties often meet for practical political interests (such as in local elections). Such political bartering is prevalent in Indonesian political action.⁶¹

In addition to the finality of Pancasila as Indonesia's national philosophy, the issue of gender equality has been used frequently by nationalist parties for their interests. They claim that all social and biological sexes should have an equal place in front of Indonesian politics, creating gender justice in Indonesian politics—which has been discriminatory against women for years.⁶² In Indonesia, women are frequently framed as being created by God to take action behind the scenes, rather than in public. Women are framed as the supporters of men, rather than actors in and of themselves. Even when women become political actors, they are expected to ask their husbands for permission. Unlike men, women are expected to avoid practical

⁵⁹ Michael Buehler, "Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties: Comparing Shari'a Politics in Two Indonesian Provinces," *Comparative Politics* 46, 1 (2013): pp. 63–82.

⁶⁰ Aulia Nastiti and Sari Ratri, "Emotive Politics: Islamic Organizations and Religious Mobilization in Indonesia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 40, 2 (2018): pp. 196–221.

⁶¹ Edward Aspinall et al., "Elites, Masses, and Democratic Decline in Indonesia," *Democratization* 27, 4 (2020): pp. 505–526.

⁶² M Tajali, "Protesting Gender Discrimination from within: Women's Political Representation on Behalf of Islamic Parties," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 44, 2 (2017): pp. 176–193.

politics if so prohibited by their husbands, who are considered to have the authority in determining their wives' involvement in practical politics and the public sphere.⁶³

Given this common framing, it can be said that both nationalist and Islamic parties still practice gender discrimination. Few women candidates are fielded, and those who are selected are generally chosen simply to meet the gender quotas for elections; by law, at least 30% of legislative candidates must be women.⁶⁴ Indeed, many nationalist politicians have made discriminatory statements, such as labelling women as weaker than men and as seeking only to be spoiled. In National Parliament, both nationalist and Islamic parties have reached a threshold of 10% women legislators; these include PPP, PDIP, PKS, PAN, Golkar, Nasdem, PKB, Gerindra, and the Democrats.⁶⁵

Part of this may be attributed to Islamic and nationalist parties' lack of a clear ideology for defending citizens. Looking at their campaign activities, both Islamic and nationalist parties simply present themselves as having a clear ideology regarding Islam and nationalism (respectively). However, both follow the interests of the market to advance themselves and their allies, leading to corruption. Likewise, both are discriminatory against women, failing to provide equal space to women and allowing men (including numerous political oligarchs) to dominate the landscape. The politically marginalised position of women occurred in Aceh and Mataram.⁶⁶

The emergence of Ganjar Pranowo as a presidential candidate from PDIP attracted the attention of Islamists because Islamists tended to support candidate Anies Rasyid Baswedan, who was nominated by the Nasdem Party and PKS.⁶⁷ Meanwhile, the military

⁶³ Yudi Latif, "The Religiosity, Nationality, and Sociality of Pancasila: Toward Pancasila through Soekarno's Way," *Studia Islamika* 25, 2 (2018): pp. 207–245.

⁶⁴ Dicky Sofjan, "Religion, Public Policy and Social Transformation in Southeast Asia Religion, Identity and Gender," *Globethics.Net* 2 (2017).

⁶⁵ Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, "Indonesia's Democratic Paradox: Competitive Elections amidst Rising Illiberalism," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 55, 3 (2019): pp. 295–317.

⁶⁶ Husnul Isa Harahap, "Islamic Political Parties in Southeast Asia: The Origin And Political Problems," *Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews* 7, 5 (2019): pp. 481–489.

⁶⁷ Robertus Andrianto, "Real Count KPU 20:00: Ini Partai Pendukung Anies Yang Lolos Ke Senayan," available at <https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/research/20240222-201503-128-516911/real-count-kpu-2000-ini-partai-pendukung-anies-yang-lolos-ke-senayan>.

seems to support Prabowo Subianto, who is nominated by the Gerindra Party. The three candidates for presidential candidates can be said to represent three groups of people. Ganjar Pranowo represented the nationalists, Anis Baswedan represented the Islamists, while Prabowo Subianto represented the *priyayi* nationalists (military, civil servants and retired civil servants and businessmen). Of the three presidential candidates, they have fought over the number of votes of Muslims, which amount to 86% of Indonesia's total voters of 187 million people. The categorization of *abangan* who is synonymous with nationalist followers of PDIP, Islamist who is synonymous with followers of modernist Islam, and *priyayi* who is synonymous with employees and retirees as well as entrepreneurs is an integral part of the trichotomy politics put forward by Clifford Geertz in the 1950s.⁶⁸ However, it seems that in some cases it is still relevant to read the political map of Indonesia.

The presence of three presidential candidates representing three groups of society is a clear form that Indonesian politics can be said to be still based on what is said to be "flow" politics, even from identity politics, which is an integral part of the latest debates on Indonesian politics.⁶⁹ In the 2024 General Election, there was a change in coalition from the 2019 Presidential Election. In the 2019 elections, Prabowo-Sandi was supported by the Golkar Party, Gerindra Party, PAN, PPP and PKS. Meanwhile, in the 2024 elections, Prabowo-Gibran is supported by Gerindra Party, PAN, Golkar Party, Indonesian Solidarity Party, and Gelora Party. Thus, there are differences in the PKS and PPP coalitions with different presidential candidates. PKS supports Anies and PPP supports Ganjar.

Conclusion

Islamic and nationalist parties are continuing to fight for public political space using sensitive issues such as religion, communism, Islamism, nationalism, gender justice, and social justice, even though it is limited to political jargon. Both claims to be campaigning for good governance and social justice. However, Islamic parties emphasize the Islamization of the public sphere more firmly, while nationalist parties underscore questions of social welfare.

⁶⁸ Burhani, "Geertz's Trichotomy of Abangan, Santri, and Priyayi.

⁶⁹ Fossati, "The Resurgence of Ideology in Indonesia.

Indonesian nationalism and the constitution to attract voters. Islamic and political parties compete for women's votes but do not place women as explicit policymakers, except for PDIP and PSI, which have female leaders. All of Indonesia's Islamic parties, conversely, are led by a man.

There is fierce contestation among Islamic parties internally because they are competing for the same voters, i.e., traditional, and modernist Muslims; these voters are also targeted by nationalist parties. As such, parties may experience a decrease in votes received, especially as nationalist parties have straightforward programs, high levels of popularity, and a cultural basis in Indonesian history.

The struggle for Indonesian Islam is ideologically unclear because all of the country's Islamic parties take the same actions as nationalist parties. They perform corrupt and discriminative politics. They also do not promote prosperity among citizens except for political gimmick. This has significantly weakened the power and electability of Islamic parties, which are delegitimized in the eyes of voters by actions such as corruption, sexual harassment, and the failure to uphold the political ideology once espoused by the forebears.

Noting the ongoing political movements of Islamic parties, including their exploitation of religious sentiments and hatred for nationalist parties, they cannot be expected to provide the future of Indonesia. Moderate and open Islam can only be expected from mainstream Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU, which have deep cultural roots and have spread a moderate and inclusive Islam in Indonesia since their establishment. As shown by history, Muhammadiyah and NU have always cooperated with the government and other religious communities, without turning to practical politics.

Based on the study that has been conducted in this article, it can be said that Islamic parties still get votes even though they are less than nationalist-religious parties. Parties such as PDIP, Golkar Party, Gerindra, Nasdem Party and Democrat Party remain larger vote holders than PKS, PPP, PBB and Gelora Party. This indicates that even though the majority of Indonesia's population is Muslim, in general elections, Muslims vote for non-Islamic parties. This is also a sign that the will of Islamic activists to establish Islamic parties is not necessarily supported by voters in general elections, such as the case of 2024 elections. []

References

Books and Articles

- Afrianty, Dina. "Agents for Change: Local Women's Organizations and Domestic Violence in Indonesia." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 174, 1 (2018).
- Ahmad, Nyarwi. "Populist Political Ideation and Communication of Gubernatorial Candidates in Indonesia's 2018 Gubernatorial Elections: Anti-Establishment Views, Secular Nationalism and Islamism as Ideational-Populist Elements." *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* 1 (2020).
- Aspinall, Edward. "A Nation in Fragments: Patronage and Neoliberalism in Contemporary Indonesia." *Critical Asian Studies* 45, 1 (2013).
- Aspinall, Edward, and Ward Berenschot. *Democracy for Sale: Elections, Clientelism, and the State in Indonesia*. London: Cornell University Press Ithaca and London, 2019.
- Aspinall, Edward, Diego Fossati, Burhanuddin Muhtadi, and Eve Warburton. "Elites, Masses, and Democratic Decline in Indonesia." *Democratization* 27, 4 (2020).
- Aspinall, Edward, and Marcus Mietzner. "Indonesia's Democratic Paradox: Competitive Elections amidst Rising Illiberalism." *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 55, 3 (2019).
- . "Indonesian Politics in 2014: Democracy's Close Call." *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 50, 3 (2014).
- Bayat, Asef. "Islamism and Social Movement Theory." *Third World Quarterly* 26, 6 (2005).
- Brenner, Suzanne. "Private Moralities in the Public Sphere: Democratization, Islam, and Gender in Indonesia." *American Anthropologist* 113, 3 (2011).
- Buehler, Michael. "Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties: Comparing Shari'a Politics in Two Indonesian Provinces." *Comparative Politics* 46, 1 (2013).

- Burhani, Ahmad Najib. "Geertz's Trichotomy of Abangan, Santri, and Priyayi Controversy and Continuity." *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 11, 2 (2017).
- Chalik, Abdul, Achmad Room Fitrianto, and Ma'shum Ma'shum. "Between Values and Power; Ideological Orientation of Santri-Based Parties in Indonesia." *Journal of Social and Political Sciences* 2, 4 (2019).
- Dewi, Kurniawati Hastuti. "Piety and Sexuality in a Public Sphere: Experiences of Javanese Muslim Women's Political Leadership." *Asian Journal of Women's Studies* 23, 3 (2017)
- Diprose, Rachael, Dave McRae, and Vedi R. Hadiz. "Two Decades of Reformasi in Indonesia: Its Illiberal Turn." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 49, 5 (2019).
- Elson, R. E., and Chiara Formichi. "Why Did Kartosuwiryo Start Shooting? An Account of Dutch-Republican-Islamic Forces Interaction in West Java, 1945-49." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 42, 3 (2011).
- Fossati, Diego. "The Resurgence of Ideology in Indonesia: Political Islam, Aliran and Political Behaviour." *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 38, 2 (2019).
- Hadiz, Vedi R. "Imagine All the People? Mobilising Islamic Populism for Right-Wing Politics in Indonesia." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 48, 4 (2018).
- Hakim, Masykur. "Soeharto and the Politicization of Indonesian Islam (1968-1998)." *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 10, 2 (2016).
- Harahap, Husnul Isa. "Islamic Political Parties in Southeast Asia: The Origin And Political Problems." *Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews* 7, 5 (2019).
- Hidayatullah, Syarif. "The Consolidation of the Islamic Traditionalism: A Case Study of the Nahdatul Ulama." *Prosiding the 4th International Conference on Indonesian Studies: "Unity, Diversity, and Future"* 4 (2012).
- Hoffman, Bruce, Jacob Ware, and Ezra Shapiro. "Assessing the Threat of Incel Violence." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 43, 7 (2020).

- Ibrahim, Farid Wajdi Dicky Wirianto, Shohibul Adib. "The Thought Of Figures Of Islamic Mass Organization About Caliphate: A Case Study In Banda Aceh And West Java." *Jurnal Ilmiah Islam Futura (JIIF)* 22, 2 (2022).
- Kayane, Yuka. "Historical Formation of Islamist Ideology in Indonesia: The Role of the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (DDII)." *Critical Asian Studies* (2021).
- Kesuma, Arsyad Sobby, Abdul Halim, Nur Syam. "The Religious Politics of Habaib in Surabaya and Bangil East Java: A Socio-Religio-Political Approach". *QIJIS, Qudus International Journal of Islamic Studies* 10, 2 (2022).
- Kuperberg, Rebecca. "Intersectional Violence against Women in Politics." *Politics and Gender* 14, 4 (2018).
- Latif, Yudi. "The Religiosity, Nationality, and Sociality of Pancasila: Toward Pancasila through Soekarno's Way." *Studia Islamika* 25, 2 (2018).
- Machmudi, Yon. "The Emergence of New Santri in Indonesia." *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 2, 1 (2008).
- Masud, Muhammad Khalid. "Religion and State Are Twin Brothers : Classical Muslim Political Theory." *Islam and Civilisational Renewal* 9, 1 (2018).
- Mufidah, Ch. "Complexities in Dealing with Gender Inequality: Muslim Women and Mosque-Based Social Services in East Java Indonesia." *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 11, 2 (2017).
- Mujani, Saiful. "Religious Democrats: Democratic Culture and Muslim Political Participation in Post-Suharto Indonesia." *ProQuest Dissertations and Theses*, 2003.
- Munabari, F. "Reconciling Sharia with 'Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia': The Ideology and Framing Strategies of the Indonesian Forum of Islamic Society (FUI)." *International Area Studies Review* 20, 3 (2017).
- Munhanif, Ali, A. Bakir Ihsan, 'Ideas, Politics, and The Making of Muslim Democracy: An Historical Trajectory in Indonesia,' *Studia Islamika* 30, 3 (2023)

- Nashir, Haedar, Zuly Qodir, Achmad Nurmandi, and Hasse Jubba. "Muhammadiyah's Moderation Stance in the 2019 General Election: Critical Views from Within" *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 57, 1 (2019).
- Nastiti, Aulia, and Sari Ratri. "Emotive Politics: Islamic Organizations and Religious Mobilization in Indonesia." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 40, 2 (2018).
- Noor, Firman. "Islamic Party and Pluralism: The View and Attitude of Masyumi towards Pluralism in Politics (1945-1960)." *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 54, 2 (2016).
- Pepinsky, Thomas B., R. William Liddle, and Saiful Mujani. "Testing Islam's Political Advantage: Evidence from Indonesia." *American Journal of Political Science* 56, 3 (2012).
- Pierskalla, Jan H., Adam Lauretig, Andrew S. Rosenberg, and Audrey Sacks. "Democratization and Representative Bureaucracy: An Analysis of Promotion Patterns in Indonesia's Civil Service, 1980–2015." *American Journal of Political Science* (2020).
- Poerwandari, Elizabeth Kristi, Ratna Batara Munti, and Jackie Viemilawati. "Pro-Women's Policy Advocacy Movements in Indonesia: Struggles and Reflections." *Asian Journal of Women's Studies* 24, 4 (2018).
- Romli, Lili. "Electoral Power Structure of Islamic Parties in Reform Era Indonesia." *Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review* 5, 2 (2020).
- Safa'at, Muchamad Ali. "Indonesian Secularities On the Influence of the State-Islam Relationship on Legal and Political Developments." *HCAS's Working Paper Series* 13 (2019).
- Tajali, M. "Protesting Gender Discrimination from within: Women's Political Representation on Behalf of Islamic Parties." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 44, 2 (2017).
- Warburton, Eve, and Edward Aspinall. "Explaining Indonesia's Democratic Regression: Structure, Agency and Popular Opinion." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 41, 2 (2019).

Wieringa, S E. "The Impact of Indonesia's 2019 Presidential Campaign on the Human Rights Movement: Narrow Solidarity versus Affinity." *Open Journal of Political Science* (2020).

Interviews

Interview with Busyro Muqoddas, 25 June 2022.

Interview with Faozan Amar, 12 June 2022.

Interview with Hajriyanto Y. Tohari, 19 June 2022.

Interview with Rizal Sukma, 19 June 2022.

Interview with Zuhairi Mizrawi, 19 June 2022.